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Abstract:
This short paper is intended to describe a research project in progress. Success/failure of information
systems (IS) is a critical discussion in the literature. The constructivist approach to this problem has
emphasised the importance of narratives in determining whether the implementation of an information
is said to have succeeded or failed. This research project aims to extend the existing literature of
success/failure by considering a case study of a pharmaceutical firm that implemented a forecasting
support system (FSS). It examines the contrasting narratives of success and failure that emerge from
the organization and from forecasting scientists observing and evaluating forecasting practices at the
firm against idealised norms. This paper proposes, although it does not develop, a theoretical
perspective on this situation drawn from Habermas’ ideas of lifeworld/system in order to explain how
different interpretations of rational behaviour in forecasting can emerge.
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1.0 Introduction and review of the literature
The emergence of information technology as a vital tool for managerial tasks has been
paralleled by the growth of research that asks how this tool can be developed,
implemented and used successfully in organizations. This manifests itself particularly
in the information systems (IS) literature in analyses that locate an IS failure within an
organization and then attempt to unravel its origins. This research historically
originated in discussions of mechanical deficiencies (Lyytinen, 1987), but
increasingly focused on cases not of simple failure to function, but problems of
mismanagement, misuse, and abandonment (Wilson and Howcroft, 2002).
Epistemologically, two approaches have emerged within this debate. One strand of
this literature attempts to isolate the factors that predict and/or permit success. This
literature has developed normative descriptions of idealized development and
implementation processes, and proposed multiple tools and techniques to mitigate the
risk of failure (e.g. DeLone and McLean, 1992). Research of this type suggests that
methods can be found to identify, manage and/or avoid potentially failure-inducing
issues related to the organization, human participants and the organizational culture in
which the technology is to operate (Mitev, 2000).
This literature is critiqued by a second thread of this debate, which argues that
normative and instrumental approaches to understanding the failure of information
systems rely upon an faulty assumption that technology is inherently neutral (Mitev,
2000). The second type of research, by contrast, broadly identifies with constructivist
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schools of thought. Success or failure of information systems is understood in this
view to be socially constituted. It is determined by the dominant narrative that
emerges from organizational participants, irrespective of the extent to which the
project conforms to checklists of success (Wilson and Howcroft, 2002). This type of
analysis therefore relies upon investigating the relationship between value-laden
technological change and patterns of interests and power within the firm. Recent
examples include Brown and Jones (1998), who consider narratives of doom that
emerged in a failed IS project at a UK hospital; Fincham (2002), who considers the
emergence of different dominant success/failure narratives within two financial
services firms; and Bartis and Mitev (2008) who discussed the impact of managers
“disguising” a failure as a success in order to save face or secure power in a case
study firm. These case studies all consider competing intra-organizational narratives.
This short paper outlines research in progress intended to extend this latter literature.
This research project will consider a case study where the dominant narrative that
emerged from a large pharmaceutical firm about the implementation of a new
forecasting support system (FSS) was one of success. It will contrast this to a
narrative of at least partial failure that emerges from the scientific forecasting
community as they observe the underlying technologies in use. This latter narrative
forms a part of a wider critique of the effectiveness of the transfer of key technologies
from the scientific forecasting community to the practitioner audience.
A minor theme in the specialist literature on forecasting has been an examination of
perceived gaps between „best practices‟ developed and promoted by the academic
community and practices observed within firms (Mahmoud et al., 1992, Fildes et al.,
2003). Much of this literature follows a similar pattern to the positivist IS literature:
researchers have proposed checklists and other tools to help forecasters and the
organizations they serve to identify and avoid causes of failure (e.g. Armstrong, 1982,
Moon et al., 2003). This position has led to avenues of research that seek to mitigate
what are perceived as common errors in practice. Researchers have proposed, for
example, mathematical interventions that second-guess human forecasters (e.g.
Daveydenko et al., 2010), and software designs that guide and educate the user as he
or she produces forecasts (Fildes et al., 2006). More recently, however, some research
has suggested that the widespread deviations between academic theory and practice
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cannot simply be dismissed as failures of good sense, but must have some, as yet
unidentified, rational motive (Fildes et al., 2003, Lawrence and O'Connor, 2000).
The central question the research project described here addresses therefore is how
practices understood as successful, rational and beneficial by the organization could
be construed as irrational and wasteful by organizational outsiders. This question of
success/failure will be examined through an analytical lens taken from Habermas‟
ideas of communicative action and lifeworld/system (Habermas, 1987). This research
proposes to explore the relationship between the lifeworld of forecasters in an
organization and the generalized systems proposed by the scientific forecasting
community, and how the interaction between these lifeworlds and systems produces
narratives of success and failure.
In his book A Theory of Communicative Action (1987), Habermas contrasted different
idealized forms of rationality: technical rationality, which is geared towards strategic
and instrumental action; and that geared towards a predominately consensual mode of
co-ordinating action, which he calls practical rationality. Habermas uses the term
„lifeworld‟ (p. 126) to describe this latter form of reasoning, and refers to the former
as „systems‟ (p. 82). In the lifeworld, participants are required to submit claims they
make about the world to the judgement of their peers, defending and explaining their
claims in order to confirm their legitimacy. Systems emerge when these rules are
partially relaxed. Systems represent a legitimation of certain types of claims, based on
a shared understanding of their defensibility. Habermas argues that a crisis occurs in
societies when these systems become decoupled from the lifeworlds in which they
originated, and begin to colonize lifeworlds where the underlying legitimacy of the
system has not been demonstrated.
This research proposes to explore this approach as it applies to the success/failure of
forecasting at a case study firm. It will argue that the firm‟s forecasting practice was a
lifeworld partially colonized by the instrumental rationality of the system of
forecasting as encoded in a forecasting support system. The differing views of success
and failure emerge from contradictory perspectives on the case study firm‟s ability to
preserve elements of their lifeworld: for the firm, this represents a successful
implementation that permitted consensual forms of rationality endure; for forecasting
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researchers, this represents a failure to fully translate their own consensus into an
organization
This paper will first introduce the case study firm, and the divergence between
internal and external narratives that emerge from this description. This will be
prefaced by a short description of the data collection phase. The paper will then
conclude by briefly introducing outlining future work to explore these ideas with
reference to the case study.

2.0 Methodology
A combination of qualitative and quantitative data has been collected from a large
manufacturing firm in order to develop an interpretive case study, intended to provide
a rich picture of a forecasting support system in practice (Walsham, 1995). Qualitative
data collected includes a set of semi-structured interviews with two employees
directly responsible for forecasting, known in this firm as logistics managers, and
forecast users, including managers from finance, marketing, sales and the supply
chain. In total, these interviews produced approximately seventy pages of transcribed
text. Additionally, researchers were permitted to observe and record discussions at
routine forecasting and planning meetings between forecasters and other interested
parties within the organization. Quantitative data collected included a sample of 3264
forecasts provided by the company for which the actual outcomes were known.

3.0 Case study
TruMed UK (a pseudonym) is the UK subsidiary of a large conglomerate in the
pharmaceutical sector. Some years ago the firm purchased a piece of software of a
type generically known as a “forecasting support system” (FSS), which it has used
continuously since implementation. Users of this system (forecasters) attempt to
predict future demand for the organization‟s products in the short-to-medium term.
Forecasting outputs are typically used by the firm to make decisions about production
planning, inventory management and distribution.
Forecasts were the responsibility of three logistics managers based in the supply chain
function. They produced forecasts for about 350 different stock keeping units (SKUs),
as well as managing the associated inventory. Forecasts were produced every month,
5

looking ahead two months, and in theory organizational practice followed a welldefined process, consisting of three distinct phases: data cleaning, analysis and
forecast production, and adjustment for managerial intelligence.
„Cleaning‟ the dataset involved removing errors and known inconsistencies from the
sales history. In the analysis phase, forecasters attempted to identify patterns and
trends in demand and extend these into the future, creating forecasts for the next
several months. Finally, forecasters made adjustments to these outputs to reflect
managerial intelligence (MI) that historical data could not capture, such as product
promotions, competitor actions or anticipated changes in macro-economic or
regulatory conditions. The effectiveness of TruMed‟s forecasting process was
measured by statistical accuracy, or the degree of correspondence between forecasts
and actual outcomes.
Historically, the analysis and forecast production stage had been a rather laborious
manual process. Forecasters used generic spreadsheet software and produced handdrawn graphs and diagrams to present, discuss and amend forecasts in regular
forecasting meetings. One of the logistics managers observed that the new FSS was
intended to “take some of the drudgery out of the task” of producing forecasts. The
new package was chosen by a group of middle managers in consultation with both
forecasters and forecast users. It was particularly praised by sales and marketing
managers because of the ease with which managerial information could be integrated
into forecasts.
The package chosen by TruMed UK was fairly typical of off-the-shelf forecasting
software. It consisted of a combination of a database which contained a sales history
and a set of statistical algorithms for analysis. Although specialist application training
was available from the software vendor and more general training on statistical
forecasting methods was widely available in the UK, none of the three Logistics
Managers had undertaken any specific training related to their forecasting role.
At the time of this study, with the system fully implemented, at least eighty person
hours were dedicated each month to producing, modifying and validating forecasts
within the firm. Much of this time and effort was concentrated on the integration and
validation of managerial intelligence into what were known as “base-line” or
“system” forecasts. Lengthy meetings would be conducted to reach agreement on
6

adjustments to the system forecasts, presented on screen for meeting participants
through the graphical facilities of the software.
When prompted, interviewees could enumerate a number of minor issues with the
software, but by and large it was described as a valuable and appropriate tool for the
task of forecasting TruMed products. The FSS was said to be an integral part of the
firm‟s improved, more rational forecasting process, and was thought (though without
empirical evidence) to have improved forecasting outcomes overall. When prompted,
forecasters suggested that forecast accuracy at TruMed still had room for
improvement, but there was little appetite in the organization for changing the FSS or
the manner in which it was used.
In practice, however, TruMed‟s forecasting practices blurred many of the lines
between tasks in the forecasting process. In particular, the method of producing the
initial “system” forecast in many cases deviated from the stated methodology.
Forecasters would often obtain a statistical forecast from the software but then make
multiple, time-consuming adjustments to make sure that the forecasts “looked right”.
It was claimed this was done because important elements of consumer behaviour
could not be captured by statistical methods. These adjusted forecasts were then
presented as “system forecasts” at the related forecasting meeting, even though they
bore little relationship to the statistical forecast initially produced.
The use of the facility for adjustments based on managerial intelligence also varied
substantially. In one meeting, system forecasts – both authentically system-generated
and adjusted – were again overwritten on the advice of an experienced product
manager to “look right” in accordance with her perception of the market. Forecasts in
another product area were subject to close scrutiny by meeting participants and
adjusted for perceived micro-trends in the quantitative data.
To investigate the impact of these adjustments to the forecasts, a set of control
forecasts was generated using a similar piece of off-the-shelf software and compared
to the outputs provided by TruMed and the actual figures for the same time period.
Although space does not permit a thorough analysis of the results in this paper,
essentially this review found that (a) forecasts adulterated at the “system” phase were
not on average significantly improved by the additional person-hours of work
involved (11.74% error as compared to 12.0% error); and (b) while the average
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accuracy of forecasts adjusted for management intelligence was an improvement
(14.3% error as compared to 17.3% error before MI adjustments) only about half of
the forecasts were improved. The remainder either remained approximately as
accurate or actually worsened as a result of adjustment, particularly when the
adjustment was relatively small.
In implementation in TruMed, therefore, it is not at all clear that this FSS has been a
success from the perspective of scientist/forecasters observing the use of the
underlying technology. Forecasters in TruMed made unintended use of the adjustment
process to introduce data into forecasts that was, by these standards, neither
legitimate, nor, analysis suggests, necessary, and claimed this as the output of a
rational, statistical process. Perhaps worse, from the perspective of the forecasting
scientists‟ ideal system, is that as much as half of the considerable spent adjusting
forecasts was spent making them worse, or at best no better than before. To the canon
of the forecasting literature, the situation at TruMed was largely explicable only by
suggesting that the organization suffered from mismanagement and/or a want of
proper forecasting education. The organization would be urged to undertake an audit
of their practice, and make haste to introduce reform and improvement. Yet, this need
for improvement that forecasting scientists could readily identify was not at all
apparent to members of the organization.

4.0 Future Work
The task that lies ahead in this research project is to try to reconcile these divergent
narratives; to understand how this technology as it is used in TruMed can be
understood both as a success within the firm and as, at best, a corrupted mediocrity by
forecasting scientists.
In order to do so, we have a number of key issues to explore through the
lifeworld/systems lens that Habermas has proposed. First, we plan to explore the
lifeworld of TruMed‟s forecasting practice. A critical point will be to establish the
ways in which claims to truth about the future demand for TruMed‟s products are
expressed, challenged and defended within the firm, noting that in this wellestablished practice a number of Habermas‟ „short-cut‟ systems are likely to have
taken root. Our next task is to examine how the forecasting support system, which we
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would characterize as a decoupled system intentionally deployed to colonize
forecasting practices, impacted upon TruMed. We suggest that the diffusion of the
forecasting support system is viewed as a success by the firm for precisely the same
reason as forecasting scientists regarded it as a failure: the forecasting support system
was not able to fully colonize forecasting practice. The expectation of forecasting
scientists that outputs from the system would have a short-cut to legitimation because
of the inherent rationality of the means of their production was disappointed. For
actors within the firm, the preservation of the practical rationality of their lifeworld,
which permitted them to challenge and effect change in system outputs, was the basis
of their belief in its success.
Clearly this research, once complete, will be subject to certain limitations. It relies on
a single case, and therefore has the usual problems of generalizability. Moreover,
there are inherent difficulties in translating Habermas‟ idealized notions of
lifeworld/system into empirical contexts. In particular, this research faces the problem
of whether lifeworld/system elements can authentically be distinguished from one
another in an empirical setting, and whether an organizational activity of this type can
ever be described as an “ideal speech” situation, in which genuine attempts are made
to reach consensus. However, it is hoped that this research will engage with fruitfully
with these issues, and suggest directions for future research that may further resolve
these difficulties.
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